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ABSTRACT
The advance in wireless communication and positioning systems has permitted
development of a large variety of location-based services that, for example, can help
people easily locate family members or find nearest gas station or restaurant.

As

location-based services become more and more popular, concerns are growing about the
misuse of location information by malicious parties. In order to preserve location privacy,
many efforts have been devoted to preventing service providers from determining users’
exact locations. Few works have sought to help users manage their privacy preferences;
however management of privacy is an important issue in real applications. This work
developed an easy-to-use location privacy management system. Specifically, it defines a
succinct yet expressive location privacy policy constructs that can be easily understood
by ordinary users. The system provides various policy management functions including
policy composition, policy conflict detection, and policy recommendation. Policy
composition allows users to insert and delete policies. Policy conflict detection will
automatically check conflict among policies whenever there is any change. The policy
recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on users’ basic
requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. A system prototype has been implemented
and evaluated in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Advances in wireless communication and positioning systems (e.g., GPS) have
permitted development of a large variety of location-based services (LBS). Such services
may tell users the waiting time for a table in a nearby restaurant, or tell user when friends
are located within walking distance.
As location-based services become more and more popular, concerns are
increasing about misuse of location information by malicious parties. Since LBS
providers can now continuously track and transmit a user’s location information, users
receive LBSs at the expense of sacrificing their location privacy. Location-detection
devices pose a major privacy threat on its users where it tracks and transmits private
information. Exposure of location information may put users into the danger of criminal
behaviors. Kidnappers could take advantage of LBSs to acquire a target’s location
information. Also, it is possible that your moving device such as cell phones will be
chocked by junk message from advertisers if there is a bonding of phone numbers and
location services. Some users will not be willing to disclose location information in
particular circumstances in particular time. Location privacy has been a major concern
due to its common use in our daily life. For example, a user may want to know the
waiting time for a table in a nearby restaurant. User may also wish to be notified when
friends are located within walking distance. All these applications require an extensive
use of location data [1]. Many governments and organizations have initiated studies of
location privacy. For instance, in 1890 US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated
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that “the right to be left alone” is one of the fundamental rights of a democracy. US
government has recently initiated a discussion of privacy in connection with the Location
Privacy Protection Act [2]. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Geoprive
working group [3] is also studying the requirements of location privacy. In summary,
location privacy refers to the right of individuals to decide how, when, and for what
purposes their location information can be disclosed to other parties. The lack of location
privacy protection can be misused by a malicious party to launch attacks without the
user’s consent, compromising the user’s personal privacy and security. Serious privacy
issues must be addressed to satisfy both public concern and the need for compliance with
current legislation.
To decrease the efforts to track an individual’s movements, many location
privacy protection methods have been proposed. Information privacy concerns have
mounted globally [4,5]. Issues range from detailed, publicly available satellite imagery
over collection on the internet to DNA database. Most of existing efforts focus on
preventing service providers from knowing users’ exact locations. Privacy could be
protected in such applications by rendering the data anonymous before sharing it with
application service providers. An anonymous location dataset provides strong privacy
protection while allowing sharing with arbitrary data consumers, since no purposebinding restricts the data for certain uses. However, this approach requires techniques
beyond omitting obvious identifiers, since the spatiotemporal characteristics of the data
allow tracking and re-identification of anonymous vehicles when user density is low.
Therefore, a common strategy is to use an anonymization agent [6, 7, 8] to distort users’
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real locations and send the distorted locations to the service provider. The service
provider will directly process the distorted data to answer location-based queries. The
anonymization agent is responsible for converting the query results back to the form that
the end-users can understand. For example, in [9, 10], the anonymization agent will
“cloak” users’ locations before sending them to the LBS by providing their location at a
lower resolution in terms of time and space. In other words, rather than giving a precise
location and time instant, the agent would report a larger region covered in a time frame.
K-anonymity has also been used often to measure general privacy [11,12-22]. It requires
that each user can report his location only when there are more than k-1 other users in the
same region. These approaches help improve location privacy of end-users.
Despite extensive works on protecting users privacy against service providers,
few works have been done to help users manage their privacy preferences; however
management of privacy is an important issue to be addressed in real applications. In
[23,24-29], some simple location privacy policies were suggested to govern who can use
an individual’s location data under what conditions. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there is not a comprehensive system for location privacy policy management.
This work developed an easy-to-use location privacy management system. Specifically, it
defines a succinct yet expressive location privacy policy constructs that can be easily
understood by ordinary users. The system provides various policy management functions
including policy composition, policy conflict detection, and policy recommendation.
Policy composition allows users to insert and delete policies. Policy conflict detection
will automatically check conflict among policies whenever there is any change. Policy
recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on users’ basic
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requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. A system prototype has been implemented
and evaluated in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.
Figure 1.1. Illustrates an overview of the proposed location privacy policy
management (LPPM) system. The system is a policy-based location privacy system. All
aspect of the system are comprised of small packets of rules, called policies. Its main job
is to display the location of users to one another. The system is comprised of policies,
with each type of policy producing its own information, and how that information is
shared. The main point of the system is to take policies in and using the information that
the differing type of policy provide, create a report that distinguish what information that
each of the relation that a person has within the system can see. Policies are set up so that
their information is reported at specific times of the day, and on specific days. Policies in
the system can be added, modified and deleted at any time, allowing users a large amount
of customization. As policies are entered into the system, they are compared to
established policies; to ensure that they do not conflict. Policies are also compared to
established policies to determine whether they can be merged together. The user interface
is set up to be convenient and clear for the user. By evaluating a prototype of the system,
a baseline of performance for a fully functional system can be established. In other word,
the prototypes worth can be used to estimate the worth of a working system. The
evaluation of the prototype of the location privacy system will show the capability of the
system and with that one can see the usefulness of the location privacy system.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Location information has been defined as a set of data associated with an
individual that describe their location over a period of time [49]. The time resolution and
location resolution vary with the technology used to collect them. There are several
methods which have been used to locate the user. One the earliest system designed for
location tracking is Global Positioning System ( GPS) and WLAN (Wireless Local Area
Network) [50].
Most of the time people are not concerned about their location privacy. However,
they are sensitive to how their location data could be used, and this sensitivity could be
increased with their awareness of privacy leaks [50]. Kaasinen made interviews with 55
people divided into 13 groups from different parts and different backgrounds . The result
of this evaluation is that users trust current service providers and policy-makers for issues
related to privacy protection.
J. Krumm in his project; he convinced over 250 people from his institution to give
them two weeks of GPS data recorded in their car. He asked 97 of them whether is it
possible to share their location data outside their institution, and the result was only 20%
of them said “no” [51].
Danezis et al. [49] asked 74 undergraduates how much they would have to be paid
to share a month’s worth of their location data. The average price was 10£, or 20£. The
major problem in location privacy may occur during the communication between the user
and the service provider; while a user is providing information to the SB the attacker may
take advantage of this location information. Andreas et al [52]. Classify the attack into
two types first-hand communication where an attacker obtains private information
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through first-hand communication when an individual unwittingly provides it directly to
the attacker. Second-hand communication:- attackers relay information from one party to
another unauthorized party; in this one an individual no longer controls the information.
Many efforts have been made to ensure users’ location privacy when they
enjoying LBSs. The approaches that researchers have proposed can be categorized as
policy-based, encryption-based, obfuscation-based, and anonymity-based approach.
2.1. POLICY-BASED APPROACH
Privacy policies are legal notices that contain statements defining what service
providers can do with a user’s personal data. Privacy policies are published by service
providers, and users decide whether such policies are acceptable to them. These policies
address many concepts and specific language is used to define them [23, 30]. Users reach
an agreement with providers about which data are collected, what these data are used for
and how they can be distributed to third parties. In this technique, privacy is understood
as the ability of individuals to decide when, what, and how information about them is
disclosed to others. Ideally, users can choose among various policies. Therefore,
depending on the selected policy, users can save some money but, on the other hand,
providers can distribute/sell some of their data.
This approach is easy to use because it not only satisfies user’s personalized
privacy requirements; but also frees the user from the continuous intervention by the
system would otherwise require to address specific cases.
Smailagic et al.[31] proposed a privacy model and methodology based on the
context-aware system Portable Help Desk. The privacy of location information is
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described by set theory and rules. Each rule establishes a list of users who are allowed or
disallowed to know the location of a user for a given duration of time. A rule establishes
one time duration and possible repetition of an event. The rule sets authorization based
on one of four visibilities, Visible to All, Invisible to Some, Visible to Some, and Invisible
to All. These visibilities are arranged as increasing restrictiveness of the set. Visible to
All allows anyone to know the location of a client user, Invisible to Some restricts only a
finite list of users, Visible to Some restricts all users except a finite number of users, and
Invisible to All restricts everyone. The conclusion shows a distribution where twice as
many people appear willing to automatically transmit their personal information to any
user, and a second group chooses greater privacy by rigorous setup of who is allowed to
inquire of their personal information. Few users choose to grant or deny access to
information separately for every request. To resolve conflicts between multiple privacy
rules; if one rule states that user A is authorized to see a client’s location at a given time
and another rule states the opposite, which rule will take precedence. The researchers
described such a situation to the users; they could respond by including “Cannot See”
meaning the client wishes their information not to be given if a conflict exists, and “Can
See” meaning the client wishes their information to be given if such a conflict exists.
Myles et al. [32] created a unifying location service called Loc-Serv, a
middleware service that lies between location-based applications and location tracking
technologies. The primary purpose of LocServ is to unify location tracking technologies
so that a location-based application can make use of multiple positioning systems. In
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essence, users of LocServ can specify a location query using any of the symbolic or
geometric location models that Loc-Serv understands. The system requires a mechanism
for controlling access to users’ location information without the needs for repeated user
intervention. It employs the same basic concepts used in P3P and pawS, using machinereadable privacy policies and user preferences to automate the process of deciding
whether or not a particular piece of location information can be released to a third-party.
Their approach can reduce the load on the user associated with processing requests for
their location information. Users can enjoy location services without continuous
interruptions from the system requesting permission to disclose current location
information. Also, the authors proposed to define private policies under ubiquitous
scenarios instead of just establishing simple privacy models for specific fields such as
business or traffic, as previous researchers had proposed. However, they do not consider
that collecting user’s decision for various scenarios is itself a heavy load for the user,
especially in some circumstances when location privacy may not be a great concern to the
user.
Snekkeness [23] proposed that individuals should be equipped with tools that
would allow them to formulate their own personal location privacy policies, subject to
applicable rules and regulations. The author identifies concepts that may be useful when
formulating such policies. The key concept is related to observation of a located object.
An observation typically includes the location, the identity of the object, the time the
observation was made, and the speed of the object. The idea is that the individual should
be able to adjust the accuracy with which these observations are released, depending on
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parameters such as the intended use of the information and the identity of the recipient.
This approach provides fragments of a language for formulating personal location
privacy policies. The main idea is that there should be established some register at some
well-known address, that for each located object contains a pointer to the location where
a personal location privacy policy for that located object is stored . A location provider
would then be obliged to receive 'release approval' from the policy custodian before any
location data could be released. Since location privacy is based on some well-known
address, the user’s location privacy may not be protected when the user is in a private
location such as residence. The drawback of this approach is that it does not provide
users with full protection, despite the variance of location.
Related research in role-based access control (RBAC) has recently received
considerable attention, and it can also be used to maintain location privacy. In RBAC,
permissions are associated with roles; users are assigned appropriate roles, and they
acquire the granted to such roles’ permissions. This approach greatly simplifies the
management of permissions. Roles can be created for the various functions of an
organization, and users can then be assigned to roles based on their responsibilities and
qualifications. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be
granted new permissions as new applications and systems are incorporated, and
permissions can be revoked for particular roles as needed. In location privacy we can
define roles such as supervisor, family, friends and strangers. Each role is assigned with
different permission to user’s location information depending on the request time and
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location. In this way, individual’s personal location privacy can be maintained and also
we don’t have to worry about the large numbers of various policies. However, since it
role-based access control, a limited number and meaning of roles may not satisfy various
needs of users for various situations in everyday life.
The goal of this approach is to satisfy a user’s personal privacy requirements. In
order to achieve this goal, a large number of policies are indispensible. As the number of
users increases, the number of policies may also increase in an exponential manner. This
makes policy-based approach not as scalable as encryption-based approaches.
The overhead of this approach comes from maintaining these policies. A large
storage space is needed to keep record of individual user’s privacy policy, and each time
a user acknowledges a request, the server has to check with the policy and then an action
can be taken according to individual’s policy. This requirement creates enormous
overhead, especially when users have detailed and complex policies.
2.2. ANONYMITY APPROACH
Anonymity-based approaches are the most sophisticated option in trusted-thirdparty-based location privacy. Instead of taking care of policies or users’ identifiers, these
approaches assume that communications are anonymous. They aim to hide users’ true
identity with respect to emitted location information.
A common way to hide the real location of users from the LBS provider is to use
the K-anonymity property. This property addresses the conflict between information loss
and disclosure risk [13].
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K-anonymity and cloaking approaches have some limitations. First, by design
cloaking relies on a trusted entity to make users’ locations anonymous. Thus all queries
should trust this entity during the system’s normal mode of operation. The entity can also
become a single point of failure; potentially creating a scalability bottle-neck because
several handshakes must occur between the user and the entity to permit exchange of user
profiles and anonymity measures. Another limitation of cloaking techniques is that either
the quality of service or overall system performance decreases significantly as users
choose to have more strict privacy preferences. For example, if a user requires better Kanonymity, the system needs to increase K for that user, which would result in a large
cloaked area and hence less accurate query responses. Alternatively, if one requires to
maintain the quality of service; the location server must resolve the spatial query for each
and every point in the cloaked region and send the entire bulky result to the entity to be
filtered out. This process clearly affects overall system performance, communication
bandwidth, and server throughput and results in more sophisticated query processing.
Finally, the concept of K-anonymity does not work in all scenarios. For example, in a
less populated area, the size of the extended area can be prohibitively large in order to
include K-1 other users.
Much work that has been based on cloaking can be found in the literature [11,
33,34]. One of the most recent advances in anonymity-based approaches was proposed in
[35], which extends an early anonymity-based approach version [33]. This extension
allows users to define their personal privacy requirements (i.e., the number K of users
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among whom they wish to be anonymous) and the maximum delay and location
perturbation they are willing to accept.
Another similar method called PrivacyGrid is described in [36]. Although the
third-party entity described in [35] and the PrivacyGrid approach are very similar, the
latter seems to be more efficient due to the cloaking techniques based on grids.
Mohamed et al. [37] tackle the privacy problem in a way that protects user
privacy while keeping the functionality of LBSs. The main idea is to employ a third
trusted party, called the Location anonymizer, which: (1) receives the exact point location
from the mobile user, (2) blurs the location point into a cloaked spatial region according
to certain constraints provided by the user, and (3) sends the cloaked spatial region to the
location-based database server. Then, the location based database server is equipped with
special modules that modify its functionality to work on the cloaked spatial region rather
than on an exact point location. The penalty of having the blurred location information is
that the location-based database server may not be able to provide a high quality service
to its users. Users would have the ability to establish a set of parameters to balance the
amount of information they would like to reveal about their locations and the quality of
service they obtain from the location-based database server. Those parameters include 1)
the level of anonymity (k), which users should specify their convenient level of privacy
by introducing the anonymity parameter k, 2) the minimum area which represents the
minimum area requirement of the cloaked spatial region, 3) the maximum area which
represents the maximum area requirement for the cloaked spatial area, and 4) the
temporal constraints that establish times during which these parameters apply. The
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disadvantage of this approach is that there is a tradeoff between anonymity and accuracy
of service. To adjust the accuracy, the user should be aware of different parameters. This
in fact brings inconvenience in use of location based service if the user wants to find a
best balance between privacy and accuracy for individual.
Gruteser and Grunwald. Present middleware architecture and algorithms that can
be used by a centralized location broker service. The adaptive algorithms adjust the
resolution of location information along spatial or temporal dimensions to meet specified
anonymity constraints based on the entities that may be using location services within a
given area. In their model, the mobile nodes communicate with external services through
a central anonymity server that is part of the trusted computing base. In an initialization
phase, the nodes set up an authenticated and encrypted connection with the anonymity
server. When a mobile node sends position and time information to an external service,
the anonymity server perturbs the position data according to a cloaking algorithm to
reduce the re-identification risk. Moreover, the anonymity server acts as a mix-router,
which randomly reorders messages from several mobile nodes, to prevent an adversary
from linking ingoing and outgoing messages at the anonymity server. Finally, the
anonymity server forwards the message to the external service. They consider a subject
as k-anonymous with respect to location information, if and only if the location
information presented is indistinguishable from the location information of at least k-1
other subjects. The key idea underlying the cloaking algorithm is that a given degree of
anonymity can be maintained by decreasing the accuracy of the spatial data revealed. To
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this end, the algorithm chooses a sufficiently large area, so that enough other subjects
inhabit the area to satisfy the anonymity constraint. However, as the size of area increases
to satisfy k-anonymity, accuracy decreases rapidly. Further, since there is an encrypted
link between the anonymity server and the user nodes, this approach may also suffer from
the disadvantages of encryption-based approaches.
Beresford and Stajano seek to make location information anonymous. Their
approach requires that users are able to change pseudonyms repeatedly, even while they
are being tracked. Users may adopt new applications with which they interact, but if the
system’s spatial and temporal resolution is sufficiently high, the applications can without
difficulty link the old and new pseudonyms. The authors sought to address this problem
by introducing the mix zone. An application doesn’t receive any location information
when users are in a mix zone, where identities are “mixed.” Assuming users change to a
new unused pseudonym whenever they enter a mix zone, applications that see a user
emerging from the mix zone cannot distinguish that user from any other who was in the
mix zone at the same time and cannot link people entering the mix zone with those
leaving it. The infrastructure delays and reorders messages from subscribers within a mix
zone to confuse observers. The problem with this system is that there must be enough
subscribers in the mix zone to provide a suitable level of anonymity. In addition, if a mix
zone has a diameter much larger than the distance the user can cover during one location
update period, the system might not mix users adequately.
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Lin et al. [38] noted that service providers can supply users with the information
they need, they have to track user movements and location. In this paper they deal with
such a problem by establishing a framework to protect location privacy. The main idea of
their system is to forward transformed user location data to the service provider. They
assume a number of different types of transformations, such as scaling, translation, or
rotation, to hide user information. They use m numbers of agents interposed between
users and service providers to implement these transformations, thus avoiding

the

negative effects of the single agent. For instance, if an enemy hacks one agent, it is still
unable to track the user. If some agents illegally keep details about consumers, they will
not be able to discover information about users without colluding with other objects.
However, the problem with approach might be that the overhead for data transformation
will increase with the increasing of number of transformation functions. Also this
approach makes querying more complicated than ever because queries must

be

transformed in order to get a correct answer.
Trusted-agent and anonymity approaches do not scale up with the number of users
in a system as well as encryption-based approach. This weakness is due to

an

intermediate layer known as the trusted agent that exists between the user and the service
provider. The computing capability of this agent is limited; therefore, as the number of
users in the system increases, the performance degrades due to a bottle-neck at the trusted
agent.
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Since every time the user gives a request, the trusted agent must satisfy the
condition of k-anonymity, this involves overhead in processing in order to satisfy this
condition. More essentially, whenever the users send information to the agent, the agent
must use some cloaking function to hide the exact information. This will inevitably
increase the computing load and degrading performance.
2.3. OBFUSCATION-BASED APPROACH
Obfuscation-based techniques are aimed at protecting location privacy by
degrading the accuracy of the location information while still maintaining an explicit
association with the real user identity.
Several techniques based on obfuscation have been proposed to preserve the
privacy of users of context-aware services. Suppose that the service is not completely
trusted by the user; therefore, since he considers his current activity (e.g. meeting
customers) a sensitive information, whether to allow or deny the access to his precise
current activity may be unsatisfactory. In fact, denying access to that data would
determine the impossibility to take advantage of that service, whereas allowing access
could result in a privacy violation. In this case, the only flexible solution is to obfuscate
[39] the private data before communicating it to the service provider. Obfuscation
techniques have been applied in the past to the protection of micro data released from
databases (e.g., in [40]).
Various obfuscation-based techniques to control the release of location
information have recently proposed (e.g., [41,42,43,44]) based on generalization or
perturbation of the user’s position. Semantic eWallet [45] is one of the first attempts to
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support privacy in generic context-aware systems through obfuscation mechanisms.
Users of the Semantic eWallet may express their preferences about the accuracy of their
context data based on the requester’s identity and on the context of the request. By
abstraction, the user can choose to generalize the data provided, or to omit some details
about it.
Other recently proposed obfuscation methods can be found in [43], which
proposes that the real location of LBS users be replaced by circular areas of variable
center and radius. One of the most recent proposals for non-collaborative trusted-thirdparty-location privacy is Space Twist [44]. This approach determines the point of interest
closets to the real location, but the LBS provider cannot determine the real location of the
user. The main advantages of this approach are that it requires no trusted third party or
collaboration, and it hides the location of the user in a controlled area. However, this
method is not able to achieve K-anonymity properties due to the lack of collaboration.
Obfuscation techniques aimed at location privacy protection. Location
obfuscation is complementary to anonymity. In particular, rather than making users
anonymous, obfuscation-based solutions assume the identification of users and introduce
perturbations into collected locations to decrease their accuracy. Duckham and Kulik [41]
developed an obfuscation technique to protect location privacy by artificially inserting
into measurements some fake points with the same probability as the real user position.
Their paper proposes a formal framework that provides a mechanism to balance user
needs for high-quality information services with location privacy.
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Obfuscation has several important advantages that complement other privacy
protection strategies. Obfuscation and anonymity are similar in that both strategies
attempt to hide data in order to protect privacy. The crucial difference between them is
that whereas anonymity aims to hide a person’s identity, obfuscation is an explicitly
spatial approach to location privacy that aims to allow a person’s identity to be revealed.
Potentially, this combats one of the key limitations of anonymity approaches: the need to
authenticate users. At the same time, degrading the quality of location information makes
inferring identity from location more difficult. If flexible enough to be tailored to specific
user requirements and contexts, obfuscation (unlike regulatory strategies) does not
require high levels of complex infrastructure and (unlike privacy policies) is less
vulnerable to inadvertent disclosure of personal information. Unlike many anonymity
approaches, it is lightweight enough to be used without the need for trusted privacy
brokers.
Obfuscation seeks a balance between the level of privacy of personal information
and the quality of the LBS. Recent research has indicated that there exist many situations
in which it is possible to expect high-quality LBSs based on quality positional
information. Consequently, in situation where the user requires a higher quality of service
than can be achieved at a user’s minimum acceptable level of privacy, then other privacy
protection strategies must be relied upon instead. Moreover, obfuscation assumes that the
individual is able to choose what information about his or her location to reveal to a
service provider. Although this assumption may be realistic when using client-based or
network-assisted positioning systems and when sharing location information with a third-
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party location-based service provider, dealing with the entities that administer networkbased positioning systems still requires privacy protection based on regulations.
2.4. POLICY-BASED ENCRYPTION APPROACH
Traditional public key encryption is coarse grained: A sender encrypts a message
M with respect to a public key, and only the owner of the (unique) secret key associated
with the public key can decrypt the resulting cipher text and recover the message. These
straightforward semantics suffice for point-to-point communication, in which encrypted
data is intended for one particular recipient who is known in advance to the sender. In
other settings, however, the sender may instead wish to define a policy determining who
is allowed to recover the encrypted data. For example, classified data might be associated
with certain keywords to which only certain users have access.
One of the first solutions was proposed in [46].The authors propose a form of
encrypted query processing combining the use of a data structure suited for managing
spatial information with a cryptographic schema for the secret sharing. On the server
side, location data are handled through a directed acyclic graph (DAG), whose nodes
correspond to Voronoi regions obtained by a tessellation of the space.
Recently, [47] proposed a cryptographic approach inspired by the private
information retrieval (PIR) fiel. The service provider builds a Voronoi tessellation
according to the stored pois, and superimposes on it a regular grid of arbitrary
granularity. Some of the advantages of this approach are that location data are never
disclosed; the user’s identity is hidden among identities of all users. However, since
mobile devices are often characterized by limited computational capability, the query
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encryption and answer processing performed on the client side have a strong impact on
service response time, and power consumption.
A cryptography system with a single secret or shared key requires users to
distribute the key securely before they can communicate in private. Such distribution can
be complex, especially if the number of users is very large.
Zhong et al. [48] designed novel protocols to implement location-based services
for mobile wireless users without using a trusted third party. One allowed users to
control which entities can have access to their location information. They identify two
major types of LBS: The first type of services directly transfers users’ location
information to authorized entities and that protect the information from unauthorized
entities, including the service provider itself. The second requires computations that take
user locations as inputs. The challenge is how to complete these computations without
revealing user locations. The basic idea of their privacy-preserving design is that only the
entities in the authorized subset should be able to derive the key to decrypt the location
information. They have shown that their protocols have low overheads and are suitable
for personal mobile devices.
A policy-based encryption method has the advantage that encryption and access
control are in one package. Not only would it provides for encryption during
transmission, but also for storage. Thus ensuring that all sensitive information being
transmitted is secure. The encryption scheme also allows us to implement access control
as only those who satisfy the policy can decrypt and have access to the record . There is
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no need for users to manage their own keys nor is there need to distribute keys. There
will be no difference for the user experience between the two choices. In both cases,
users log in and gain access to documents for which they have permission.
A common disadvantage of any encryption scheme is that records are stored
encrypted. The decryption keys must be kept for the lifetime of the record. The
decryption algorithm must also be available to recover the original documents. In order to
ensure these are both available, it may be necessary to keep a backup of the keys and
algorithm. Otherwise, it would be possible to store the records in readable format
somewhere physically secure and not connected to a network. We would need to store
backup copies of the records in plaintext regardless of which system were used, due to
possibility of hardware failure.
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3. LOCATION PRIVACY POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
This section will first present a succinct yet expressive location privacy policy
language. Then, it will describe the algorithms for policy conflict detection and policy
composition. Finally, there will be an explanation of the policy recommendation system.
3. 1. DEFINTION OF LOCATION PRIVACY POLICY
This work particularly focus on location privacy; which can be define as the
ability to prevent other unauthorized parties from learning one’s current or past location.
Polices can be broken into three categories: specialized, generalized and exception. The
three policies interact with one another and the results determine whether a user is visible
to his relationships or not. Each of the three basic policies work in very much the same
way, with a few small differences.
Definition 1: Let U1 be a creator of a policy, let U2 be the target of the policy. Let Pe be
a policy where e is the type of policy: specialized, generalized, or group privacy. A
policy will contain the following, a time period Ttime consisting of a period in hours, and
a range of days; a range of location, Location policy, that can consist of location, city,
state and country.
A few format conditions apply to all three policies. First, the targeted user or
relationship must be part of the database before a policy is valid; similarly, a user may
only make policies for people on his relationship list. The logic behind this rule is that if
the users want to create a policy, they must expect that the policy will be shown. Further,
if a user allows another user to see him, he must have some form of relationship with that
other user. Another common condition deals with time; at least 15 minutes must elapse
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between the start and end time of any of the tree policies. It is assumed that any a
considerable amount is need for a policy to be valid. Third, location must be fully defined
for a policy; that is; if a user enters information in the state filed, he must also have
provided the information for the country line, just as a state must be entered if a city is
entered and the same for location and city.
3.1.1 Specialized Policy. Specialized Policies are the main type of policy; they
require a connection between the creator of the policy, and the targeted user. Once a
policy is created for a target, whenever the target requests a list of all visible users during
the allotted time for the policy; the creator is displayed in the target’s report. Specialized
policies consist of the creator; the target; the location of the policy, and the time and day
of the policy. For example, if the creator wants to let the target to know that he will be at
the bank on Monday, he simply enters the location (Bank, City, State, and Country), the
target , the time (Stime - Etime), and Monday for both start and end date.
Definition 2: Let U1 be the creator user ,and let U2 be the individual target. Any policy
created by U1 for U2, P, will contain a period of time Ttime and a range of location
RangeLocation. During the time period Ttime the range of location RangeLocation will
be reported to U2 as the location of U1.
Checking for Specialized Policy:
Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi
Let t be time of request
Let T be the Pi period of time
Let Rloc be location of Pi
Let Pt be policy type
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Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt whose target is U1

For each policy in S, i
If t is within Si.T
Print U2 to screen
Print Rloc to screen
Loop

3.1.2 Generalized Policy. Generalized Policies, on the other hand, pertain to the
connection between the creator of the policy and a relationship role. A user can assign
each of his relationships to one of three roles, each one general enough to include most of
his associates: family, friends, and colleagues. Each user within a relationship role is
subject to the policy defined by the user for the role. Like a specialized policy, a
generalized policy consists of creator, a time period, and location. It differs in that instead
of identifying a specific user as target, the creator chooses one of the relationship types
for the policies. Generalized policies also have allowed the user to specify a privacy level
for the policy. For example, let U1 want to tell his friends that he is at school all this
week from 7 am to 3 pm. So he creates a group policy with time range of 7:00 to 15:00,
Monday to Friday, with a range of location of School, Rolla, MO, USA. U1 sends this
policy to be validated, if no policy conflicts, it will then recommend a privacy level for
the policy. Because of the average time span and very specific location, as it will be
described later on group privacy policy. The privacy level of the policy is set to high and
established in the database.
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Definition 3: Let U1 be the creator user, let Re be the targeted role where e is a role
(family, friend, or colleague). Any policy, p, created by U1 for Re, P, will contain a
period of time Ttime and a range of location RangeLocation. During the time period
Ttime the range of location RangeLocation will be reported to U2, where U2 is a relation
of U1 within the category e, as the location of U1.
Checking for Generalized Policy
Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi
Let t be time of request
Let T be the Pi period of time
Let Rloc be location of Pi
Let Pt be policy type
Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt

For each policy in S, i
Let Ro be the target role of policy Si
Let Zj be the jth user in a search of users that reside in Si.U2’s relation list with role
Ro
For each user in Z, j
If U1 equals Zj and t is within Si.T and Z.Privacy Level greater than or equal
Si.Privacy level
Let Qn be the nth exception with target U1 and owner is Si.U2
For each exception in Q, n
If t is within Qn.T
Ignore
Else
Print U2
Print Rloc
Loop
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3.1.3 Exception Policy. Exceptions are additions to group policies; they exclude
a specific user from a group policy. In other words, the policy creator removes his
location from any reports that would be visible to the targeted user. Exception policies
are also much like individual policies, however, because their function is to hide
information from a specific user; they require no location. Exceptions can be set up to
allow the policy creator to hide his location from specific user for part or all of a group
policy time period. They also allow the exception policy to overlap two or more policies.
Going back to the generalized policy, assume that the creator of the policy is shopping for
a gift for one of his family member, so he may create an exception policy for this
individual.
Definition 4: Let U1 be the creator user, and let U2 be the individual target. Any
exceptions, e, created by U1 for U2, will contain a period of time, Ttime. If U1 has a
generalized or group privacy definition during the time Ttime, the location of U1 will not
be reported to U2, regardless of the definition’s targeted role.
3.1.4 Group Privacy Policy. This policy differs from the other three in that it is
three policies in one. This type of policy allows a user to display his location to all users
that are assigned to a certain role, but to limit the information available to each user in a
given role based on privacy level. A group privacy policy contains the creator, the
targeted role, and a time period and location range for each of the three levels of privacy.
For example, user1 wants to create a policy to tell all his friends that he will be in
Montana for the weekend, but he only wants to let his closet friends know what city he
will be in. So he sets the target role to friend, and enters a time period and location range
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for each level of privacy. For close friends, User1 wants his friends to know that from
Friday to Sunday All day (00:00 – 23:59), that he will be in Helena, Montana, USA. For
most friends, he only wants them to know that he will be in the state of Montana;
therefore, he specifies the same time period, but changes location range to Montana, USA.
Lastly for friends who are only allowed to know that he will be on his way home at 8:00
am on Monday, he changes the time range to Monday from 5:00 to 8:00 am and the
location range to Airport, Helena, Montana, USA.
Checking for Group Privacy Policy
Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi
Let t be time of request
Let T be the Pi period of time
Let Rloc be location of Pi
Let Pt be policy type
Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt
For each policy in S, i
Let Ro be be target role of policy Si
Let Zj be the jth user in a search of users that reside in Si.U2’s relation list with role
Ro
For each user in Z, j
If U1 equals Zj and t is within Si.T and Zi.Privacy Level equal Si.Privacy level
Let Qn be the nth exception with target U1 and owner is Si.U2
For each exception in Q, n
If t is within Qn.T
Ignore
Else
Print U2
Print Rloc
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Loop
Loop

3.2. POLICY CONFLICT DETECTION
All forms of conflict deal with similar elements and terms. The basic idea to
conflict is that User1 cannot be in two places at once; therefore a conflict can occur for
either time, location, or both. Location levels are based on a location hierarchy, figure
(2). Location is the most specific level, and country is the least. The location level that
takes priority depending on the type of interaction.
The concept of similar times is tricky because hours must be defined as circular
time and weekdays as linear. Let Se be the start time for the established policies, Sn be
the new policy start time, and Ee and En be the established end time and new end time,
respectively. Two policies have similar times if either the start or end time of the new
policy is between the established start and end time as shown in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1 The location hierarchy for the system.
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Two policies also share similar time if the established time period of one is between the
new time periods as shown in Figure 3.2.
Finally, because of the linear timeline, if the established end time is less than the
established start time, we need to see if either the new start time or the new end time is
between the established start time and one second before midnight, 23:59:59, or midnight
00:00:00 and the established end time as shown in Figure 3.3.

Figure 3.2 Time conflict.
(Se ≤ Sn ≤ Ee) OR (Se ≤ En ≤ Ee).

Figure 3.3 Time conflict.
(Sn ≤ Se) AND (Ee≤ En).
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Figure 3.4 The circular time line conflict.
(EE ≤ SE) AND ((SE ≤ (SN or EN) ≤ 23 : 59 : 59) OR (00 : 00 : 00 ≤ (SN or EN) ≤ EE)).

Let Se and Ee be the time period of an established policy, and let Sn and En be
the time period for new policy. If Se is 3:00 and Ee is 13:00, neither Sn nor En can be
between the established time nor can the Sn start before Se or the En ended after Ee. If
one were to enter Sn as 17:00 and En as 16:00, it would conflict with the established time,
as the time periods overlap
3.2.1. Types of Conflict.
Generalized-to-Specialized Policy
Not all generalized and specialized policies conflict. Conflict requires that
specific conditions must be met. First there must be a similar time and day range. A
generalized policy will conflict with established specialized policy if it has the same
location level or higher. Inversely a specialized definition conflicts with an establish
group if it's location level is the same or lower than the established generalized definition.
For instance, Let there an established generalized policy by U1 that is a middle level
policy, and let user have three friends; Uh, Um, and Ul; that have a high, middle, and low
privacy level respectively. U1 tries to create a policy for each of his friends that overlap
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in time with the established group policy. Based on our assumption the established
generalized will conflict with the policy of the high and middle level users, but as Ul
cannot see the generalized policy, it will not conflict with the generalized policy; like in
the figure below. However, if the generalized policy is changed to a low level policy, it
will conflict with all three users, as all users can see the policy.

Figure 3.5 Conflict between generalized to specialized policy.
Conflict Algorithm Generalized to Specialized:
Let Pt be policy type
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target
Let T be period of time
Let Rloc be range of location
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let Z be pending policy
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1
For each policy in S, i
Let Ro2 be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target Si.U2
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If Si.T over laps Z.T and Ro equals Ro2
If Si.Rloc less than or equal to Z.Rloc or Z.Rloc in different location
from
Si.Rloc

Conflict Algorithm Specialized to Group Privacy Policy
Let Pt be policy type
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target
Let T be period of time
Let Rloc be range of location
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let Z be pending policy
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 and target role
is Ro and Privacy level is PL
For each policy in S, i
If Si.T over laps Z.T
If Si.Rloc greater than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from
Si.Rloc
Notify of conflict
Loop

Generalized-to-Exception Policy
Generalized and exception policies do not conflict because the latter are part of
the former. In other words, exceptions are used in conjunction with generalized policies
and must therefore be able to overlap one another.
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Another way to think of exceptions is as a subset for any generalized policies that
occur at the same time. As a subset of the generalized policies as presented in the figure
below.

Figure 3.6 Overlapping between the generalized and exception policy.

Specialized-to-Exception Policy
Because a specialized policy makes a user visible, and exception policies
effectively do the opposite, any overlap between the two is considered a conflict. A
User1 cannot request that he be both visible and invisible.
Group-Privacy-to-Generalized policy
A group privacy policy is essentially three group policies connected in a single
policy. As such, the conflict between a generalized policy and a group privacy policy
may exist between any of the three group policies individually and the generalized policy.
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If any of the times conflict, then both policies are in conflict with one another; see Figure
3.7.
Conflict Algorithm Group Privacy Policy to Generalized

Let U1 be the creator, Let U2 be the target
Let T be the time period
Let Rloc be the range of location
Let Z be the Pending Policy
Let Si be the ith policy of a search of policy type PG owned by U1 with target U2
For each policy in S, i
Let E be Z.PPe
If E.T over laps Si.T and E.Privacy Level is less than or equal to Si.Privacy
Level
Notify of conflict

Conflict Algorithm Generalized to Group Privacy Policy
Let U1 be the creator, Let U2 be the target
Let T be the time period
Let Rloc be the range of location
Let Z be the Pending Policy
Let Si be the ith policy of a search of policy type PP owned by U1 with target U2

For each policy in S, i
Let E be Si.PPe
If Z.T over laps E.T and Z.Privacy Level is greater than or equal to Si.
Privacy Level
Notify of conflict
Loop
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Figure 3.7 Conflict between the generalized and group privacy policy.

Group Privacy-to-Exception
Exception policies interact with group privacy policies in much the same way as
they interact with group policies. Exceptions cannot conflict with group privacy policies
because they are used with such parties.
Group-Privacy-to-specialized
Unlike generalized definition, specialized definitions will not conflict with an
entire Group Privacy definition, but with the individual policy that corresponds to the
target user’s privacy level. Take for instance, that the example described for group
privacy definition was enacted. If the creator of the group privacy policy, User1, wanted
to create an individual policy for a low privacy level friend at 4:30 am – 5:30 am Monday
for the Hotel Lobby, the new individual policy would conflict with the lower level of the
group privacy policy, but if the day of the week were to be changed to Sunday, which
would conflict the middle and high level parts of the policy. However, even if we made
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this change as the targeted friend is a low level user, the two policies do not conflict, and
the policy is allowed to be established as shown in Figure 3.8.

Figure 3.8 Conflict between Group-Privacy and specialized.
Conflict Algorithm Group-Privacy Policy to Specialized Policy.
Let Pt be policy type
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target
Let T be period of time
Let Rloc be range of location
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let Z be pending policy
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1
For each policy in S, i
Let Ro2 be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target Si.U2
Let PL2 be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target
Si.U2
If Si.T over laps Z.T and Ro equals Ro2 and PL2 equals PL
If Si.Rloc less than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from
Si.Rloc
Notify of conflict
Loop
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Conflict Algorithm Specialized to Group Privacy Policy
Let Pt be policy type
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target
Let T be period of time
Let Rloc be range of location
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2
Let Z be pending policy
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 and target role
is Ro and Privacy level is PL
For each policy in S, i
If Si.T over laps Z.T
If Si.Rloc greater than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from
Si.Rloc
Notify of conflict
Loop
Notify of conflict clear

3.2.2 Outline of Policy Conflict Detection Algorithm. When checking for the
location of other users, the system first differentiates between the three types of visible
definitions. The tables for each type of policy are requested individually from the
database. Policies are separated by the targeted users and roles, after separating the
policies, they are selected by whether the selected user is within the group of the current
policy. The policies are then selected if they are within the time of the policies are
selected. Finally, the policies are compared to established exceptions, if they conflict,
then the conflicting policy is not retrieved.
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3.3. POLICY COMPOSITION
3.3.1. Policy Insertion. To insert a policy into the system is to create a new
policy to be inserted into the database. This is the most used function of the program, to
be able to add new policies. Policies are first submitted, then are checked for validity,
then are checked against established policies to confirm or deny conflicts and then lastly
if the policy is valid, it is inserted into the database.
3.3.2. Policy Modification. Modify polices is more or less altering established
policies in accordance to conflict conditions. Much like inserting the user resubmits the
policies, which in turn is check for validity, compared to other established policy, and
finally reemitted to the database.
3.3.3. Policy Deletion. Deleting a policy is straight forward. When a policy is
requested to be deleted, the policy is first checked if it has multiple definitions, that is to
say multiple time periods. If there does exists multiple definitions, only the requested
definition is to be deleted, on the other hand if there is only one definition, the entire
policy is deleted.
3.3.4 Merging Policies. When an established policy is merged with a new policy,
the new time range of the policy is added to the existing policy, allowing a policy to be
enacted at multiple times. The standard conditions for such actions are simple: The two
polices must share a targeted user, creator, and location, and they must not overlap in
time. There are added conditions, however, for each of the four policy definitions. For
specialized and generalized definitions, there are no added conditions if the above
conditions are satisfied and the creator wishes to merge the policy, they will merge.
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Exceptions have no merging conditions as exceptions cannot be merged as they have no
information to show to a user. Group Privacy definitions are a little different, for merging
to be possible for a group privacy policy, the above conditions must be held true for all
three policies.
Merging Policy
Let Pt be policy type
Let U1 be creator of policy, Let U2 be target
Let T be period of Time
Let Rloc be range of location
Let Z be pending policy
Let Si be the ith policy from a search of policies of type Pt with creator U1
For each policy in S, i
If Z.Rloc equals Si.Rloc and Z.T does not overlap Si.T
Request for merge
If request is accepted
Create merge policy
Else
Clear Z
Loop to beginning

3.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM
The policy recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on
users’ basic requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. In what follows, we first
define a concept of privacy level and then present our recommendation algorithm.
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3.4.1 Definition of Policy Privacy Levels. When a user creates a new group
policy, they are recommended a privacy level for said policy. This privacy level dictates
which categories of relations in a role are allowed to see the policy. Visibility is based on
a level hierarchy, with High privacy at the top and Low privacy at the bottom. Any user
at the group policy’s privacy level or high can see the policy, that is low level policy can
be view by all three level, high and middle level friends can see middle level policy and
only high level friends can see high level policies. Privacy levels for group policies are
based on a calculated number, which is created from an algorithm based on the range of
location and period of time. The user designates in a separate window the location weight,
that is to say what location level policy weight is, like making the weight of City level
policy to be 15 and Location level to 0. The default weight for each location level 0 for
location, 20 for City, 55 for state and 90 for country, as each is more generalized then the
next. The Location weight is subtracted from the time weight, which can be between 0
and 100 to calculate the privacy level, as show below:

Stime is the start time for a policy hours.
Etime is the end time for a policy hours.
Sday Start time for a policy day and Eday the end time for a policy day. Where the time
line for the day start at Saturday=6, and end at Sunday=0.
The formula for time is set up so that is follows a Cartesian path similar to y= √x
where y is the difference in time, and x is the difference in days. But the ratio between the
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two differences must equal one when they are at their maximums, that is to say 23= 71/x
and solving for x leads to x equal to .613. The ratio is then times 100 to turn the decimal
into a percentage. After finding the privacy weight, if the weight falls between the cut off
points for the three levels of privacy, that level of privacy is recommended. If the weight
falls between 100 and 71it is a high level, if it between 70 and 24 it’s middle and
anything 23 or lower is a low level policy.
The cut off points are based on policy disturbed and the weights of generic
scenarios of policies. For example a generic low level policy is 4 hours and 4 days and a
state level policy, so its weight is (4.613/ (7-3)) * 100 – 55 ≈ 3, and a generic middle level
is 8 hours, one day, and a city level policy weight is (8.613/ (7-0)) * 100 – 20 ≈ 31. But we
also want to have the policy distributed so that a majority of them are low level policies,
and that there are more middle level policies then high level. As such the middle level
range needs to be expanded so that the percent distribution is 62.5% low policies, 23%
middle policies, and 14.5% high level polices.
The default location weights for the four level of location; location, city, state and
country; were decided based on estimates and less on a mathematical project. The weight
for each location level does not need to be very exact, as the defaults are only to be used
as a suggestion. As such the estimation are pretty loose location being zero as it needs to
be the lightest and country needs to be the heaviest, so make things much simpler, the
default is 100. As state level should be about between the location and country location
add much closer to country, so making state level fifty-five leads to be closer to the
country level and be about the middle of the spectrum. Lastly the city level must be
between the state level of fifty-five and the location level of zero, and be closer to the

43
lighter location level, so I estimated the city level to have a weight of twenty. The reason
for the large gap between the city and state is because there is a large difference between
a city area and a state area, as such there should be a large gap between the two location
levels.
3.4.2 Policy Recommendation Algorithm. The policy recommendation works as
follows. Whenever a policy is inserted into the system, its privacy level will be computed
and stored. Then, when a user would like to compose a new policy, the user can tell the
system that what kind of policy that he wants. For example, the user can indicate that he
would like to assign a medium level privacy policy to his new friend Bob. Upon the
user’s request, the system will search the existing policies and find the policies with
medium privacy level. Among the retrieved policies, the policy which contains similar
role of Bob will be returned to the user as a recommended policy. The user can either
accept the recommended policy as it is or modify the policy. In this way, users no longer
need to scribe new policies each time.
Recommend Policy
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be targeted role
Let TS be starting hour, Let TE be ending hour
Let DS be starting day, Let DE be ending day
Let Rloc be range of location
Let S be policy in weight table with owner U1 and target role U2
For each element in S that matches range of Rloc, E
Let location weight equal to E
Let Time weight equal to (|T_S-T_E |^.613/(|D_S-D_E |+1))*10
Let Privacy equal the absolute difference between location weight and time
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weight
If Privacy greater then 70
Recommend High level in dialog box
Else If Privacy greater then 21
Recommend Middle level in dialog box
Else
Recommend Low level in dialog box
Insert Policy in system with insertion algorithm with recommended level.
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4.PERFORMANCE STUDY
The system model was implemented using Microsoft Access, this choice ensure
ease of access, but leads to sacrifices some security features. The maximum file size of
an Access database file is two gigabytes. In addition to a maximum size, there are also a
maximum number of objects that can be within a database file within a given time.
32,768 objects can be part of the database as at any time. Lastly is the capacity of users
that can be concurrently on the stream which is 255, but like file size one can split
database across a distributed network of databases, effectively raising the cap on
concurrent users.
The system was implemented based on two languages: Visual Basic and SQL.


Visual Basic: As this experiment called for simply a model to test with, visual

basic was an acceptable language to program end. By using visual basic we could create
the need input and windows for the program without extra work, allowing more time for
the internals of the program. Visual basic allowed me to quickly mock up the interface,
and then add the needed underling code quickly and concisely. Visual Basic was also
considered because I have had the experience needed to connect the user interface to the
background database in SQL.
Visual Basic’s function in the program was for the most part for the user
interface. The interfaced needed to be simple, user friendly, and able to work correctly.
The interface desired to guide a user to the proper policy and display the policies that user
has already created. Visual Basic other function was to communicate with the database
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using SQL and using the data giving to back to visual basic, evaluate whether a policy
conflicts with established policies.


Structured Query Language: SQL was planned to be used from the beginning to

be used in the project as it is optimized for select statements and for creating and
modifying both tables and tuples in the database used. Microsoft Access SQL was
selected for ease of use. Although difficult to secure and not recommended for a
complete system. It was adequate for this experiment, and it offered the added benefit of
a graphical user interface, so that a table and database can be created easily and one can
modify tuples quite quickly.
The primary function of SQL in the project was to run the database
communications sent by Visual Basic. Because SQL is optimized for selecting tuples
from tables using varying forms of condition, it is very vital to the functioning of conflict
algorithms, as the conflict are very specific and among the four types of policies and their
interaction with one another.
The following discussion evaluates the system in terms of both effectiveness and
efficiency.
4.1 EFFECTIVENESS
The user interface was designed to be convenient and simple for the user. All
user functions were set up to be in one place so that a user can easily maneuver to want
they wish to do quickly. All the functions are grouped together in terms of what they
affect. The interface is simplified so that it is easy to understand.
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4.1.1 Main Window. The main window works as a hub for all processes the user
wishes to do, it contains access to adding, modifying, and deleting both policies and
relationships. The status window displays the user’s name and the large area within the
window, displays policies that the logged in users has in the system, displaying the
targeted role or user, the location, and the start/end time of the policy, as shown in Figure
4.1. If a user wishes to see where other users are, he must click the See Relations button
to bring up the visible relationship list. Exceptions are separated from the three other
types of policy definition for clarity, and by clicking the exception window brings up a
separate window that allows the users to add, delete and modify exceptions.

Figure 4.1 Main window of the system.
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4.1.2 Adding Specialized or Generalized Policy. Clicking the Add Policy brings
up a second window, and enter the user’s ID into the first text box. The second row
contains a dropdown box, this contain a list of all users with individual’s relationship list.
This makes it convenient for the individual to target a user, without having to remember
the targeted user’s ID. Figure 4.2 illustrates the range of location is separated into
textboxes to better clarify what is to be entered. The start time and end time portion is
done as a pair of numerical up and down, allowing the user to select time. Lastly the
weekday appears as a drop down window for easy selection. The Adding group policies
does not differ much from individual policy, except rather than a target user, there is a
targeted role.

Figure 4.2 Adding specialized and generalized policy.

49
4.1.3 Adding Group Privacy Policies. Clicking the Privacy Policy button lead to
the group privacy policy; see Figure 4.3. Like group and individual policy the policy
starts with the creator’s ID and a targeted role, but the elements contain change from here.
Three buttons below the target role, these are the separate policy for each privacy level.
The user clicks and input each level sparely clicking add, to close the window. After
adding information for each level, clicking add in the main window to adds this policy to
the user’s policies. Before adding the policy to the database the system recommends a
privacy level for the policy bring up a window with the recommend level and three
button one for each of the level. After choosing the desired level, the policy is finally set
into the database.

Figure 4.3 Adding group privacy policy.
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4.1.4 Modifying Policies. By selecting an established policy then clicking Modify
Policy, this bring up the modify policy window. Each window looks much like it
respective add policy, except that the input boxes are filled with the previously entered
input as shown in Figure 4.4. Changing any information within this window will change
the information of the established policy.

Figure 4.4 Modifying policy.

4.1.5 Deleting Policies. Deleting is very simple, first highlighting the established
policy and clicks Removing Policy. This will bring up a confirmation dialog box, clicking
yes will delete the established policy, while clicking no will return the user to the main
status window. After clicking yes the main policy window will repopulate, showing that
the policy has been deleted.
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4.1.6. Exception Window. Clicking the exception window brings up the
exception status window. The exception is separated from the other three policies to
clarify the distinction between them. Aside from the separation, there is no really
difference in appearance. This window contains the options for exceptions: adding,
modifying, and deleting. When bringing up the window it populates with established
exceptions. Like the main window the large area in the middle of the exception window,
this is the policy window. This area displays established exceptions showing the policy’s
ID, the user that exception targets and the starting and ending time of the exception.
Closing the window brings the main status window as illustrated in Figure 4.5.

Figure 4.5 Show how to make exception policy.
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4.1.7 Relationship Feature. The relationship functions are not important part of
the system but are needed for policy definitions. The relationship list displays the user’s
relations and what role they are part of. Adding, modifying and deleting friend is much
like how it is done with policy definition; see Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.6 Relationship window.

4.2. EFFICIENCY
As the time for an action is based on the speed of Visual Basic, SQL, the speed of
the connection and many other varying factors, a fixed measurement of time cannot be
acquired. As such, estimating the time complexity in the big O notation should yield a
useful measurement of time. Before talking more in-depth on the main function’s time
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complexity, there are a few facts that need to be established first. For one is the
complexity of basic functions of SQL, insert and select.
Selecting a tuple or tuples from a table can have one of two complexities, based
on whether or not the database is indexed. If a table is set up to be indexed by it primary
number key, its complexity is of order O(log(n)), on the other hand if the table is not
indexed its complexity becomes of order O(n). As for inserting into a database, an
indexed database has an insertion complexity of O(log(n2)), because the table must be
searched and the tuple to be inserted must be evaluated on where to place it. On the other
hand with an unindexed table needs only to add the new tuple to the end of the table,
making the complexity O(1). Secondly is the type of database to be used, which is to say
whether the database is to be indexed or unindexed. While an indexed database lowers
the time spent when selecting information from tables, its insertion time is much higher
than that of the unindexed insertion. For this reason the model is unindexed.
Estimating the time complexity of the model is based off the main action of the
system: conflict analysis, viewing other user’s policies, and finally checking for your own
policies. We do not need to estimate all tasks, as big O notation estimates are based on
the most important aspects of the systems. The first major action the user will come
across is the checking and displaying policies. This is the simplest major action of the
system, as it only is doing a condition select statement. Because it is just a conditional
select statement, the complexity of the statement is simply O(n). There are three tables to
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check when looking for all policies, individual policies, group policies, and group privacy
policy. As such because there are three checks and the base complexity becomes O(3n).
Next is finding visible users. This is a complex action, as each of the three
visibility policies has its own complexity. The individual policy is a straight forward
selection, making it of O(n). The group policy is of order O(nm). This is because how
group policy is searched for. Let n be the number of policies in the group policies tables,
and let m be the number of people in the relationship table. For each group policy, n, the
entire relationship m must be checked, making the complexity, O(nm). Group privacy
policy is much like group policy except it is essentially three group policies. Thus each
group privacy policies, must be checked three times, one for each sub policy, making its
complexity O((3n)m). Combining the complexities boors O((3m+1)nm + n), and
dropping the n to simplify the order, we estimate the complexity to be O((3m+1)nm). The
last major action is conflict analysis. Conflict check varies among the four policy
definitions. The average number of checks for each policy is approximately three. Each
checks itself is a simple search making it of order O(3n).
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5. CONCLUSION
This thesis, presents a location privacy policy management system. It has three
main functions. First, it helps compose location privacy policies for users who subscribe
to location-based services. Second, it automatically detects policy conflict whenever there
is a policy update. In this way, policy management becomes an easy task for users.
Thirdly, it also provides an important feature, which is the policy recommendations.
Users do not need to compose new policies for every new friend. Instead, the system will
generate recommended policies based on existing privacy policies on the similar group of
users. In all, the ultimate goal of our proposed system is to ease the burden on end users;
when managing their privacy preferences so that they can fully enjoy the benefits of
LBSs. The system prototype has been evaluated in terms of both efficiency and
effectiveness.
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